It was agreed that FOG would be a Joint organization and roles and tasks were developed for each-always mindful of the Title 10/50 issues.īoth Army and the Agency recognized the changed nature of the world and the requirements of the emerging terrorist/hostage issues. Gen Meyer, Gen Vaught (DAMO-OD), and LTC Jim Longhofer (DAMO-ODSO), traveled to Langley and met with the new Director and his operational elements director. A DOD lawyer was assigned to the development planning, and Col Jerry King (MG Vaught's Chief of Staff for the Iran JTF) became the first head of the FOG. ![]() But, it was also clear that some form of operational melding was essential to effectively address operational requirements. The planners in DAMO-ODSO were acutely aware of the different legal authorities contained in Title 10 and Title 50 statutes. Exactly who would execute the direct-action operations, would be determined after the intelligence determine the situational necessities. The Chief’s planning element determined that DOD/Army needed to create a Joint Army-CIA force that would both develop quality intelligence abroad, but also provide site support for direct action operations. As with both the establishment of JSOC, TF160/SOAR and Ranger SOF, the task was not easy. This was the birth of the Field Operations Group (FOG)-later ISA/Secret Army of Northern Virginia. Meyer was determined that no future SOF OP with Army forces would be conducted absent credible quality CIA/DOD/NSA and Army intelligence. The "Pakistani cook" piece, delivered as Delta boarded the aircraft, was viewed as an implausible source though subsequent inquiry revealed that the crucial info was available much earlier, but intentionally not shared for several reasons. Meyer was incensed at the lack of CIA interest/dedication/support to the rescue task and believed that was a major factor in the failure. This was never forthcoming despite the greatest pressure upon the Agency. The JTF was largely dependent upon the CIA to provide the vital confirming HUMINT as to the hostage location. Had the force been aware of the actual hostage location and situation, the force could have continued past Desert One and probably succeeded. The rescue force was forced to launch with sketchy data forcing a worst-case force list. World conditions in the early 1980s suggested that some capability was required to address the ambiguous conflicts of each Title authority into some form of credible operational capability.Īfter the rescue attempt, then CSA Shy Meyer, convened a small group of people within Army DCSOPS to address future SOF/CT structure in the aftermath of the failure, and while still under a POTUS mandate, to be prepared to conduct an In-Extremis rescue within 10 days.Ī key driver for the meeting was the recognition that quality operational intelligence was virtually non-existent. Parsing one from the other can be quite difficult and largely determined by the location and nature of the target. In sum, Uniforms do Clandestine, Civvies do Covert. Covert operations are shrouded in plausible deniability. Failed Clandestine operations, usually result in some form of USG explanation. ![]() To lawyers, this is a distinction with a difference. This includes Clandestine operations, but not those which are Covert. Title 10 is the broad statute regarding what DOD is authorized to do. The separation did not fit real world requirements which was finally recognized in the aftermath of the failed Iran rescue. Lawyers for both Titles within the respective DOD and CIA bureaucracies, fought to preserve their interpretations of applications, to prevent one department from intruding into the territory of the other. To this point, the CIA and the DOD followed separate independent paths as defined by statutes contained in Title 10 (DOD authorities) and Title 50 (Intelligence agency authorities). Key was the requirement to develop a competent counter resolution force. The emerging problems our Nation faced in the early 1980s with terrorism, airplane hijacking, and hostage taking, created considerable challenges for the government (USG) to resolve. Part 1 of 3 - Rangers and TF160/SOAR to Follow The Birth of the Field Operations Group (Later Intelligence Support Activity / Secret Army of Northern Virginia)
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